Alex is a feminist, femsub, and dear friend of mine (as well as erstwhile spankee). She has recently embarked on a PhD project exploring disgust, sexuality and the law, and is now charting her progress in a new and fascinating blog, Abject Intimacies. Here’s a snippet from the first entry:
“…Biographically, I have always been drawn to certain things that many people consider disgusting, As a kid who loved her ability to not ‘get grossed out’ by much, I suppose that has stuck. I am not squeamish. I have a few fears, but very few squicks. I acknowledge that feelings of fear, discomfort and disgust can be desirable, if not exactly pleasurable. The best example I can give is the horror film (about which much more later). Film critics have spent decades trying to assess why gorefest horror movies can easily draw an audience, some arguing that the audience enjoys taking the position of sadist, relishing the suffering of whoever the film’s victims are. Others argue that they are accessing masochism — identifying with the film’s sufferers and desiring to be pushed to a place of such discomfort that it is close to unbearable. The experience of wincing, hiding behind one’s hands, moaning and whimpering; that is all part of the horror movie’s pleasure.
When it came to writing a PhD proposal, again I found myself drawn to ideas and concepts around disgust. But meanwhile, in the year I completed my MA, I was working with Backlash and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill became an Act, outlawing the possession of ‘extreme’ pornography…
…Among the debates raging over whether pornography incites violence or incites attitudes that legitimise violence, there was far less discussion about the part of the clause I am most interested in: the issue of moral protectionism, or protection simply from merely feeling disgust that other adults might find pleasure in activities that are not to one’s taste, and began to question the intersection of disgust and law, particularly when applied to sexuality. How much are our moral parameters affected by our emotional responses? Do these emotional responses have a legitimate social function or convey a particular kind of wisdom? Are they important enough that legislation should take them into account? If — as has been the case with homosexuality — moral parameters are subject to change, should what is considered disgusting be subject to regular scrutiny? And finally, if we do not want to do away with the legal role of disgust altogether, what part could it play in constructing contemporary ideas of morality…?”
Read more from this post here.
